INTEREST

OF

GREAT BRITAIN,

RESPECTING THE

FRENCH WAR.

By WILLIAM FOX.

THE FOURTH EDITION, CORRECTED.

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MONGST the peculiar circumstances attending the French revolution; the most interesting, and the most remarkable, is the general horror with which it is viewed by the European Monarchs, and the extenfive and powerful combination which has been formed amongst them to suppress it. The terror it has produced feems to have totally abforbed every other confideration, to have united the most discordant interests, destroyed the most inveterate prejudices, and the most violent jealousies. It has even driven the Pope to feek refuge in a nation, which has for more than two centuries had the misfortune to lie under his interdict, and to that monarch whose subjects he has most solemnly discharged from their allegiance to him. An investigation into the cause of this political phenomenon may not be uninteresting, even exclusive of the important

confequences likely to refult from ic.

The revolt of fubjects against their sovereigns, is not a very rare occurence; the king of Great Britain has recently experienced an important one, by which he lost the far greater part of his dominions, without exciting any very great concern amongst his fellow monarchs, or any very powerful combination of them in his support. Even republicanism has not heretofore appeared to excite any confiderable alarm; America, Holland, Switzerland, nay, England, in the last century, renounced the authority of their fovereigns, and formed republics, yet the monarchs of Europe abetted their revolt, and fought their alliance. An antipathy to republicanism cannot be pretended, in this case, to be the motive for this confederacy against France, because it existed at a time, when instead of dethroning their monarch, though intirely at their disposal, they voluntarily left him a share of power, dangerous to the fafety and peace of the kingdom, and granted him a civil lift to the utmost of his defire, and much larger than that enjoyed by the king of England. Far less can the recent cruelties in France be deemed the cause, as those were the effect, and not the cause of the royal confederacy. For when it was first formed, far less blood had been shed in France than in any revolution of equal importance, and a limited monarchy appeared to be peaceably

established. No part of the abhorrence of the French revolution can therefore be attributed to the instability of the government, or the changes it has undergone, because they were the natural consequences of the hostile measures pursued against it. Mr. Pitt acknowledges, that the limited monarchy of France appeared to have been formed with the general concurrence of the people. Had that government then been left undiffurbed. Had not the king, the clergy, and nobles of France been tempted by the hope of powerful foreign aid, to endeavour the subversion of the new tormed government, its permanency, its peaceable establishment, was far more promising than could reasonably have been expected, from the nature of the convulsion, and the importance of the change which had taken place. All the calamities which have fince appeared, and the perilous fituation of the royal family of France, may therefore be far more properly attributed to Messrs. Burke and Calonne, who have been indefatigable in inciting the prefent clamour, than to the people of France.

At the time these men undertook the horrid task of inciting all Europe against that people, they had declared, that having obtained liberty with the fword, they wished to sheath it for ever. They expressly disclaimed any hostile design on the most desenceless state; they did not appear to entertain any views inimical to the peace of the furrounding nations, nor the least intention of interfering in their concerns. They appeared disposed to fit down peaceably, to enjoy the happiness they expected to derive from the revolution they had effected. To us they were naturally led to look rather as allies, than as enemies; they confidered us as the nation in Europe, whose government approximated the nearest to that which they had recently established; and when they saw the continent of Europe arming against them, they threw themselves on our justice, and proffered us the office of mediator: when this was declined, when Mr. Burke was allowed to stigmatize them with impunity, when the French princes were inciting all Europe against them, when almost every European monarch appeared disposed to attack them, and their king was supposed to be em-

ploying the immense revenue they had granted him in fupporting these measures, we cannot much wonder at the rage of the French populace or its confequences, nor will any man believe it to be the real reason of any measures which may be adopted against them. whatever may be the catastrophe of the royal family of France, or whatever may have been its origin, it can hardly be deemed a fufficient cause for deluging Europe Transitions from the throne to an untimely grave, occur in almost every page of history, they enforce the argument of the moralist, embellish the works of the poet, and form the principle pathos of the drama. In the space of about half a century the blood of four queens, as beautiful and accomplished as the queen of France, streamed on an English scaffold, and although it was an age of chivalry, not a fword started from its scabbard to avenge them. Even fovereigns themselves do not in general feem to possess very sympathetic feelings, they rarely concern themselves in the fate of those fellow monarchs, with whom their own interests are not interwoven. The present age has seen a sovereign precipitated from his throne to a prison, and from thence to his tomb; not by injured subjects, but by her whom he had raised to empire, and who now fways the bloody scepter, without having excited those exclamations of horror which feem to have been referved for the prefent occasion.

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If a regard for the Bourbons be not the real motive for this consederacy, far less can we suppose it to be a concern for the people of France. Mr. Burke and his affociates, indeed, are extremely pathetic in lamenting the mifery which they have brought upon them-That unhappy people! That miserable, felves. deluded, unfortunate country! are the epithets we apply to France; and it is perhaps the most extraordinary circumstance, in this memorable event, that thirty millions of people should so universally, and so pertinacioufly perfift in being miferable, and that it should require fuch very extraordinary means to compel them to be happy. It must be presumed that the illustrious and beneficient monarchs of Russia, of Prussia, and of Austria have placed their own subjects at the summit of happiness, that they are thus so perfectly at leisure to give happiness to the people of another country.

that the luminous geniuses of Russia of Brandenberg, and of Austria, have set out with swords in their hands to convince the French that they have mistaken the road to felicity, and that the true principles of government, of focial order, and national prosperity, are not to be judged of by human reason, but to be adopted from the banks of the Wolga, the Don, and the Oder, where antient and venerable systems of government are established, which were framed by the wisdom of antient times, improved through a fuccession of ages and fanctioned by happy expeirence. But however powerfully the Russian, Austrian, and Prussian armies may contend in favor of these systems, it becomes us to paule on the subject, because it is possible the illustrious monarchs may be interested in the question, and some persons may be apt to furmise, that were the misery refulting from the French principles, real, the benevolent monarchs would have left these people undisturbed, to have been as miserable as they pleased, as a terrible example to deter furrounding nations, from subverting antient fystems, or rebelling against their dread fovereigns.

Let us then inquire a little into the nature of those principles, which have caused such universal alarm, and threaten such universal mischief. First let us ask what they are? " Men being all free, equal, and indepen-" dent, no one can be put out of his estate without his own " consent, by agreeing with other men to join and unite in a " community. Thus, that which begins, and actually con-" cludes any political society, is nothing but the consent of a " number of free men, capable of a majority to unite and " incorporate into such society; and this is that, and that " only, which did, or could, give beginning to any lawful " government.—The supreme power cannot lawfully or " rightly take from man, any part of his property without " his own consent. - There remains inherent in the people, " a power to remove or alter the legislative, when they find " the legislative act contrary to the trust reposed in them; " for when such trust is abused, it is thereby forfeited, and devolves to those who gave it."

Are these the principles of the French revolution? they are; but they are not extracted from the paltry, blurred, scraps of the Rights of Man; they are taken

from the celebrated Mr. Locke's Treatife on Government, written avowedly for the purpose of desending the English revolution; and for writing of which, he was rewarded with a thousand a year from the British government.

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It should feem then that these principles are not quite new, that the French philosophers have not invented them; they have it feems for a century past curfed this country, and now they are fermenting and fpreading their baneful effects through Europe. It is not then the principles themselves, but it is these principles becoming French, which constitutes the danger; while they were confined to this foggy island, while they were locked up in a language almost unknown upon the continent, the monarchs of Europe were either strangers to their existence, or fearless of their effects. But when these principles are adopted by a nation, fituated in the midst of happy despotic monarchies; by a nation whose language is the universal language of Europe; and whose writers by their genius, their wit, their learning, and their tafte, had almost monopolized the literature of Europe; then it was that these principles excited their alarm, and threatened danger. The French writers have until lately been admired through Europe, patronized by kings and applauded by nobles. Some of them indeed were tinctured with deism, some even with atheism; but that did not feem much to diminish their celebrity, or draw down the indignation of the monarchs and nobles of Europe. But when these writers adopted the principles of Mr. Locke, when these principles began to operate, when the state of France threatened an extensive circulation of them. Then the alarm commenced; then it was discovered that the only writers in Europe, who were univerfally read, were a fet of unhappy, miterable philosophers. That the only literary nation on the continent, were inadequate judges of their own happiness, and that it was requisite to fend them Russian and Prussian soldiers to teach it them.

Let it not be imagined that I mean to infinuate, that these principles are not dangerous. Principles of liberty, whether English, French, or Polish certainly are dangerous to the despots of Europe, in proportion as they

are beneficial to their fubjects; and that these despots should unite to eradicate these principles, by destroying the new Polish and French governments is extremely natural. I only mean to dispute the propriety of our

joining the confederacy.

But probably I may be told that the French have introduced some new principles in addition to Mr. Locke's. True, but these principles do not seem to be very mischievous, or very hostile to human happiness. To renounce foreign conquests and aggressive war—To confine themselves to the arts of peace, content with cultivating the soil, and improving the natural advantages beaven bath alloted them—To improve the human species by national education, thus attaching man to society by enabling him to partake of its benefits, and apportioning human happiness as equally as possible amongst human kind. These if errors, do not seem to be of a very atrocious nature, and should they fail of being realised, it ought rather excite our sorrow and commiseration, than our

contempt, our indignation, or our vengeance.

But it is faid, that in the seeming excellence of these principles, confifts their danger; that by these reveries of literary enthusiasts, mankind are induced to abandon a present and practicable state of happiness, in pursuit of a visionary system which never can be realized. fo, it became more peculiarly necessary that the French government should have been left undisturbed; that its impracticability and inutility might have been clearly manifested. Even the Russian peasant and the German boor might have been more content under their present despotism, had it appeared that the principles of the French revolution naturally led to a state of anarchy, or a state of despotism, more oppressive than their own; whereas the anarchy and diforders of France may now be ascribed to the obstruction it has met with, and disturbance it has received from foreign powers. Its advocates may now fairly contend—Had the French government been left to its natural course, it would have produced a state of human happiness, superior to what the world ever heheld. The despots knew it, they knew the contrast it would form, to the misery they spread around them. They resolved to prevent its maturity, they combined to strangle it in its birth. They attempted it, but in vain.

And tho' defeated, and defeated in a manner that must destroy every hope of effecting its overthrow, yet they threaten renewed hostilities; and keep them in perpetual alarm, in hope their deluded subjects may believe, that the miseries and calamities France endures from their machinations, are the

consequences of the government they have adopted.

The continental potentates have confederated against France, not from any thing peculiar to her, either as to principles, government, or conduct; and whether we stand by a calm spectator of the destruction of Polish liberty, or join the continental powers in subverting the French; in either case, it is the general principles of liberty, and not any particular modification of them we are assisting to destroy; and it is the general system of tyranny which

we in fuch case necessarily support.

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That the Austrian, Russian, and Prussian monarchs are to confederate with us to force upon France, the English Constitution, or any kind of free government, is too abfurd to be supposed. It is even not pretended by those who have promoted this war. To our confederates, the English principles of government are as obnoxious as the French. Poland had formed a government fimilar to our own; the neighbouring monarchs beheld it with abhorrence, conspired to destroy it; and his majesty of Prussia, after due deliberation, pronounced that Poland was contaminated with French principles, which he was determined to destroy. These fentiments we also apparently adopt, for with every diversified system of tyranny, with every species of arbitrary power, we can cordially coalefce; we can confederate for mutual defence. But let any system of liberty appear among the nations of Europe; let a form of government arile approximating to our own, with them we disdain treaty or alliance: we look on them with abhorrence, or turn from them with contempt; we fuffer them to be destroyed by the surrounding tyrants; and if their power proves infufficient for the purpose, we at last join the confederacy to subvert them. We at least cannot be accused of offering confraternity. We ally ourselves with any government, provided it be hostile to freedom, but liberty and happiness, it seems, we deem so estimable, that we keep them to ourselves. To fee the British arms otherwise employed, would

indeed be an uncommon circumstance. The effects of our power and influence, are indeed to be very visibly traced throughout every quarter of the globe, but alas! it is in one unvaried scene of slavery, defolation, and blood! No wonder we look with abhorrence on the French principle of communicating to others that liberty they have themselves obtained. It is a principle they certainly cannot be accused of having learned of us.

The interest the continental monarchs have in suppressing the principles of liberty, is plain and obvious; but let it be asked, what interest have we therein? I will not ask if his majesty, as elector of Hanover has any! but it will not be easy to shew, that the king and people of England can possibly have any: to them it must be perfectly indifferent whether the principles of liberty exist on the east or the west of the Rhine, or whether they be bounded by the Alps or the Pyrennees.

Yet it is the danger from these principles which is chiefly sounded in our ears. It is their principles Mr. Dundas tells us, which has rendered France obnoxious and dangerous. And it is their principles Mr. Burke so vehemently calls on us, to wage eternal war, to

eradicate.

The war then it feems is intended to subvert thefe principles? Difmissing for a moment the enquiry, whether they be true or false, dangerous or beneficial; let us ask a plain question, How a war with the French republic is to destroy them? England is their native land; here they may be deemed indigenous, in France only exotic; and whether fuffered to remain, or whether the hand of violence tears up the new planted offset, the mother plant still remains. Here if any where, that must be destroyed: not only Mr. Burke's speeches and the Duke of Richmond's letters, but Mr. Locke's writings must be configned to oblivion before the principles of the French revolution can be annihilated. not merely the principles of that revolution, but of all our modern revolutions. Mr. Locke reduced them into form for the English revolution; Mr. Molyneux reforted to them as a proper foundation for an Irish revolution; Mr. Burke's coadjutor, Dr. Price brought them forward for the American, and the national

affembly adopted them for the French revolution. They are still very little the worse for wear, and may ferve for twenty revolutions more. It is true those who have used them to effect a revolution, have usually wished, as foon as the end has been answered, to confign them to oblivion; yet they furvive. Admitting then these principles to be dangerous in the extreme; admitting also that their progress in this nation be rapid and alarming: nay, that all the exertions of government will be inadequate to preserve the public peace from the disorders that these principles will occasion. Still we must request Mr. Dundas, Mr. Burke, or Mr. Jenkinson to inform us how a war will eradicate these principles, or prevent their further progress amongst us? Supposing the Anstrian and Prussian grenadiers, with the assistance of the English guards, were to eat up thirty millions of French, and bring away the eighty-three Departments in their knap-facks; would these principles be lost? would the murder of thirty millions of people prove them to be false? or would any calamities the French may endure from the hand of violence make these principles be less admired? If it be intended to root them out, measures very different indeed from those avowed must be adopted.

Should we indeed ever be informed that we have fucceeded in restoring the antient French monarchy to its former luftre, and that the national convention have been all fent to a new Bastile, erected on purpose to receive them. Should we be told that the British arms had turned the scale, and determined the war in favor of the allied monarchs, that they had determined no longer to quarrel about the boundaries of their territories; but, from a fense of common danger had affociated together against their subjects as their common enemy; I know not but some inquisitive persons amongst us might be apt to enquire the names of the allied kings; and probably might be foolish enough to imagine, that if ever we should have an enterprising monarch on the throne, our liberties might be in rather more danger from the nations of Europe being governed by despotic monarchs, who had effectually subjugated their subjects, and had large standing armies at their absolute disposal, than if these nations were all democratic republics.—And it is not undeferving notice, that should the French revolution be suppressed, the European monarchs will have learnt a lesson from it they will not soon forget. Mr. Burke justly observes that kings will be deterred from granting their subjects any degree of liberty; they will from policy be cruel. Should the continental monarchs succeed in suppressing the French revolution, they will hardly make Mr. Burke a lying prophet. Tyrants are cruel

in proportion to their fears.

Perhaps it will be faid, we do not mean to restore the old government of France. Indeed it is not easy to furmise what is really meant by the farrage of incoherent complaints against France with which we are deafened; but certainly as most of them are philippicks against the new government, the only plain inference is, that this abominable government is to be destroyed, and as we should reasonably suppose, the old one to be restored: certainly it appears to be intended to compel them to have a king. Mr. Burke's most vehement complaint is, that they hate kings. The measures which have been pursued against them, do not seem indeed to have been extremely well calculated to remove their antipathy; and should the king of England join the confederacy against them, it is not quite certain that it will totally eradicate their strange prejudices against kings. make them love kings will certainly be rather a difficult task; the utmost we shall be able to effect, will be to compel them to swallow a king, which they will disgorge if ever it be in their power.

It is peculiar to this war, that our most imminent danger may possibly result from success. Can we believe it possible, that the monarchs of Europe, after we have assisted them to eradicate these principles out of France, will suffer them to exist in England? Must not this country have the benefit of their kind attention? The English language is becoming common on the continent, and they will hardly overlook the danger which may result from it, nor is it to be imagined that if the continent be thoroughly subjugated, England can insure her exemption from the yoke. Hence if it were to be supposed possible, that the Royal Association should totally subvert the new government of France, we might justly entertain the most dreadful apprehensions. The

continental monarchs no longer engaged in endless quarrels about the boundaries of their dominions, but combined together in one horrid confederacy to maintain their power against their subjects; all principles of benefit and importance to mankind would be eradicated. Europe would present to our view a new and a monstrous system of government indeed, far more detestable than the old. One stagnant and putrid mass of despotisim would hang over the whole continent. Then indeed the plan would present to our view a grand unity of defign. It would not appear as it now does, in unconnected and disjointed parts. If this be a part of the plan, it is carefully and prudently kept out of fight. told nothing of reciprocity. The king of England is to engage in this contest from pure motives of regard to his fellow monarchs; to preferve their dignity and power, as king of England; at least, he asks nothing for himfelf.

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But as there is little chance that these principles, whether French or English, will ever be rooted out, it may be some comfort to those who are alarmed about them, to be informed that however dangerous or however beneficial they may be in Germany; yet in England they are unimportant. As principles they have long existed in this country: they have been appealed to in both the English and American revolutions; but that they had any tendency to produce these events may be doubted. If the English, the Irish, the Scotch, or the Welfb should ever feel apprehensions sufficient to induce them to revolt, and should have it in their power to effect it, they may possibly refort to these principles, if they are to be found; but were they to be lost, that circumflance certainly would not restrain them from revolt: they would do as we did at the revolution, first effect it, and then find some Mr. Locke to form a set of principles to defend it. In the mean time there is little danger of our reforting to them, but as themes of literary discussion. Perhaps the Duke of Richmond and a few whimfical men may wish to see these principles more obviously realised in our government; but to go to war with the French for that reason, is as absurd as if we were to commence a crusade against the Turks, because a few individuals amongst us may admire the Koran; or

against the idolatrous Chinese, because an extravagant author has lately expressed his approbation of the

Heathen Theology.

The people of this country in a fituation of increafing prosperity, furrounded with comparative misery, will not be eafily induced to hazard this happiness: they will not scrutinize accurately into our form of government; nor hazard a public convulsion, by attempting fuch speculative, or even real improvements as may endanger the public peace. Some few always have been, and always will be endeavouring to draw the public notice by their speculations, but the bulk of the nation will give but little heed to them. If ever there be the least danger of their interrupting the public happiness, we shall stop our business and our pleafures for a moment, and convince them of their infignificance. That the public peace was in any danger from these principles could hardly be believed; and cannot be now even pretended. The public have manifested such an universal approbation of the government and its administration, and such a determination to support it, as was never before witnessed: all parties, all religions, all ranks, merely on being informed, by authority, that the public peace was in danger, have with unexampled zeal, pressed forward to express their attachment, without even stopping to enquire whether the danger be real or imaginary. Is this a time to tell us of danger from public commotions? If any man really thought fo, he must be convinced of his mistake; and it is certainly a little inconsistent in Mr. Burke, that he represents us as cleaving to our antient prejudices, because they are prejudices, yet confiders us as ready to run mad after the most extravagant innovations; the baneful and mischievous effects of which, he fays, we have an example of, in the mifery they have brought on the French nation. But admitting there were some ground to apprehend danger from republicans and levellers, the measures which have been taken, appear to have been fully adequate to the purpose: if libellers write, juries will convict, and courts will punish: if riots should happen, constables or soldiers will suppress them. These seem to be the proper, we have experienced them to be adequate, and they certainly are cheaper remedies for the

evil, than a war against France.

As none of the principles of the French revolution can be referred to as being either new or dangerous. Mr. Burke to stigmatize it, talks for hours, about blood and atheism, and then to produce stage effect throws daggers about the house; but after he has finished his theatric rant, he must be told, that the circumstances attending a revolution, are not its principles, and frequently not the refult of the principles. The massacre of Glencoe, or King William's bloody wars, our national debt, the septennial or riot act, were never called the principles of the English revolution. The events of August and September arose from foreign causes; had those causes not existed, the events would not have followed; yet the principles of the revolution would have been the fame; fo the hatred to kings constitutes no part of those principles, it sprang from the hatred kings have manifested to their government. The offer of confraternity was adopted to counteract the universal confederation they faw formed against them, or at least to retaliate it; and had the confederation never been formed, there is not the least evidence to prove, that either batred to kings, or the offer of confraternity would have refulted from their principles, any more than from the principles of any other republic, or than from the principles of our revolution, for even that has been difgraced with blood, and stigmatized with atheism. The refistance of our ancestors to the antient authority of the crown, during the reigns of the Stuarts, was attended with much blood-shed, and produced some ridiculous, and some disgraceful circumstances. preferving the new line of kings, and the new species of monarchy, fince 1688, we have shed no small quantity of blood, both in Ireland and in Scotland; and under circumstances, which, Mr. Burke, should he ever be disposed to undertake the task, might possibly be able to place in as odious a point of view, as he has the French massacrees.

As to both atheism and murder they are not new charges against revolution principles. Mr. Burke is only a copyist; he merely ecchos the decrees of the university of Oxford just prior to our revolution. When

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having carefully examined the principles of those very revolutionists, whose conduct and whose writings, even Mr. Burke affects to revere; that celebrated seat of piety and learning, solemnly decreed, that "the said propositions were false, seditious, impious, heretical, and blasphemous, injurious to Christianity, and destructive of all government in church and state, sitted to deprave good manners, corrupt the minds of uneasy men, stir up seditions and tumults, and lead to rebellions, murder of princes, and atheism itself." And about the same time one of the most learned and respectable of our bishops had sagacity enough to discover atheism in

Mr. Locke's writings.

But however dangerous, or however atheistical these principles might then be deemed, we now feem defirous of monopolizing them; and the opposition to the French revolution, arises in no small degree, from an apprehension that other nations may derive the same benefit from them which we have experienced. is it to be lamented that in this country there are many, who, fraught with national pride, cast a jaundiced eye around and fay, If the nations of Europe enjoy the sweets of liberty, and their commerce ceases to be exposed to arbitrary laws administered by venal judges; - if their land no langer lies uncultivated, that their nobles may enjoy the pleasures of the chace;—if myriads of clergy draw not away their wealth from the channels of industry; -if arbitrary and rapacious exaction no longer rob the artisan and the peasant of the fruit of their industry, or violence force them from their families, to fill up the ravages of death in the armies of contending despots; then those nations, possessed of superior natural advantages to ourselves, will rear their beads around us; no longer shall we retain our proud preeminenence, or hold the equilibrium of empire; confined to the natural advantages our island possesses, we shall cease to carry on half the commerce of Europe; no more will the British name carry terror through the world, or its terrors resound But let such recollect—that if from pole to pole. patriotism be a virtue, it cannot be founded on such malignant propensities; it will not lead us to wish human happiness to be circumscribed by Albion's Cliffs, or that the genius of Liberty should cast he: mantle only o'er our isle.

But admitting the overthrow of the old government in France, may, by increasing its trade, agriculture, and manufactures, be at some distant period, prejudicial to our own: admitting also, that on this malignant principle we did not scruple to act; yet on the mere impolicy of it we may safely rest the question, even under any circumstances which can possibly take place.

To re-establish the old government, we may now certainly reckon amongst the impossibilities: had that been in contemplation, we should have attempted it earlier, when the Austrian and Prussian armies were in full strength, undiminished by sickness and slaughter, and undiffraged by defeat, when their exchequers were not exhausted, and when they would not have rested solely on us for their supply; even then, no man can imagine that our weight thrown into the scale would have turned the ballance; our importance as a military power is certainly not great, and where the combined armies of Austria and Prussia have had so shameful a repulse ours would hardly have made much impression: we might to be fure, have fent a few regiments to be cut off at St. Cas, to be flaughtered in the fields of Fontenoy, or to fign a capitulation at Closter-Seven; and we may now replenish the exhausted coffers of the German princes, to enable them to obstruct the progress of republicanism in Germany, for to overthrow it in France they can have now no hope. But may it not be asked, what interest can we have in this? What concern have we whether republicanism prevail on the banks of the Rhine, the Wolga, the Danube, or the Po? If the change of the government of France will be advantageous to its trade and manufactures, and thereby become injurious to ours, it is an evil we must prepare to meet, it cannot be prevented. France is an established republic, and there, if any where, we must expect to see rising and slourishing manufactories; but from Germany, remote indeed must any fuch danger: to improve her uncultivated ground will afford employment for an increafing population, and long prevent her engaging in extensive manufactures to our prejudice, and in the mean time they will be taken of us in an increasing proportion. Germany is even now the best market we have: will she become a worse, when rich, populous, free,

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and bappy? when her forests shall be converted into cultivated villages, full of inhabitants, enjoying the comforts, perhaps the fuperfluities of life, shall we not find an additional fource of trade? If there be an event to be wished for by us of more peculiar importance than any other, it is that Germany be free, and in connection with it, that the Scheldt be opened; the British veffels will then unload our manufactures on the quays of Antwerp, from whence they will be conveyed by the Flemis canals, Rhine, &c. to the interior parts of Europe: if there be a nation to whom the opening the port of Antwerp must be highly advantageous, it is England; if there be a nation to whom (except Holland) it will be injurious, it is France; they are giving to Flanders a port far fuperior to any one they themselves possess in the channel; yet even to Flanders is it unimportant, in comparison of us, for of English manufactures chiefly,

Antwerp will become the depot.

Wars, when commenced, even on popular ground, and originating in the public voice, have usually a different termination. Ideal benefits are in general held out, but they always vanish when the great and certain evils of war come to be experienced! But in this war, not only every reflecting man will know its impolicy and abfurdity, but what is of much more importance, no object can possibly be held out to deceive the ignorant multitude: should they be even told that the large subsidies fent by us to the continent had been fo well employed by our illustrious allies, that the armies of the German potentates, and the Russian empress had been crowned with the most complete success, that French principles had been effectually eradicated out of France and Poland, and their antient and venerable governments restored, established, and secured, from the detestable innovations of reason and philosophy: yet perhaps fome may fay, the mad and boundless ambition of the court of France had been founded in our ears for above a century, it had been represented as endangering the peace and liberties of mankind; to it we attributed our wars, our taxes, our national debt, our standing army, and expensive navy. This power, Mr. Burke told us no longer existed as a nation, its army without discipline, its finances wined he could

only see a vast chasm, which once was France. And is our commerce ruined, our taxes and national debt increased? are we involved in all the calamities of war, to fill up this chasm, to restore this dreadful and dangerous power, to give discipline to its armies, and order and energy to its government? Did you regret that this dangerous government lay before you an object of commiseration and contempt? or was the danger only ideal, and you regreted that there no longer existed a pretence for perpetual war, accumulated taxes, and a

standing army?

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Indeed it is scarcely possible that this war can have been projected for any of the avowed purposes; certainly not to keep principles out of this kingdom which were in it before the French revolution took place, and will still exist, whether the French government stand or fall. The war can hardly be intended to restore the old government of France, for that, even if practicable, would be exposing ourselves to a known evil: It cannot be intended to give France a good government, for that would be injurious to our trade and manufactures; nor a bad one, for that we are told fhe has already: it is hardly intended to engage in a war, to block up Antwerp from our own shipping, nor to prevent Germany, Italy, Russia, or China from becoming republics, which can certainly do us no hurt: and a war can hardly be intended for fecuring the liberty of the Genevese, the snowy Alps to Sardinia, or the castle of St. Angelo to the Pope: we are hardly going to mount our Rozinante, to redress all the wrongs, and engage all the windmills in the world.

The motives for this war may be various—While the true born Englishmen are frantic with batred of the French, and the king terrified with the danger of Hanover; the intrigues of a divided cabinet may have produced the present serment for private purposes, and the minister may at length be propelled (as other ministers have been) into a war, which threatens to be as destructive to his popularity, as to the prosperity of the nation; and as no minister, who commenced a war, ever yet terminated it, we shall probably have to innumerate amongst the evils of this war, the loss of a minister, who has justly obtained the considence and esteem of his country.—FINIS.

bas quiyuma su su sai.